

Article

Report

Weapons

Martyrs

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Editor's suggestion

Defense?

The discovery and hidden of ۱۲-day
war airstrikes

۱۲ days of fire, from launch to hit

۱۲ days of fire, from launch to hit



Around ۳:۱۵ a.m. on June ۱۳, ۲۰۲۵, local time, several explosions rocked Tehran. Attacks that were the only spark to launch a complex operation against Iran's nuclear and missile program. The Israeli Air Force, along with domestic agents equipped with suicide drones and anti-armour weapons, had initially opened its way to the capital by suppressing part of Iran's defense network in the northwest provinces, so that around ۶:۳۰ a.m., with more than ۲۰۰ fighter jets and in five consecutive waves, dozens of targets were attacked throughout Iran. The Israeli airstrikes continued within ۱۲ days of the next ۱۲ days. Attacks referred to as the Shiran uprising in the framework of a large-scale operation plan called the Shiran uprising. Iran responded to the threat by the beginning of the largest and most intensive ballistic missile attacks. The daily firing of dozens of projectiles and a total of more than ۵۰۰ ballistic missiles in this short period of time changed the previous estimates of the Zionist side.

For many, the occurrence of direct conflict between Iran and the Zionist regime was inevitable, especially after the events of October ۷th, when the two sides were repeatedly on the verge of confrontation. This trend was manifested in Iran's two missile and drone operations, titled "The Promise of Sadiq ۱" (April ۱۳, ۲۰۱۴) and "Sadegh Promise ۲" (October ۱, ۲۰۱۴), but the culmination of this confrontation ended in the ۱۲-day war.



The Chinese introduction to this operation began when the Zionist regime targeted

the F-fire parts of Iran's S-300 defense system in Isfahan and Tehran on two occasions. Just a few months before the start of the operation, two pre-warning radar sites near the Iraqi border were targeted after the promise of Sadegh II and reduced the ability to monitor Iran's long-range radar. During this period, the Israeli air force reduced the sensitivity of Iran's pre-warning network by increasing its movements and creating a predictable pattern in the form of a routine. The operation began just when part of the capacity of the IRGC's missile force and the joint air defense forces of the army and the IRGC was dedicated to the implementation of an annual exercise. This complex operation, based on the system shock doctrine, was designed to inflict a sudden and precise blow to the organizational psychological breakdown and disrupt the command and control network. In the framework of the uprising of the small barrels, several operations were planned: the targeted assassination of high-ranking commanders of the IRGC, including martyrs Hossein Salami, Mohammad Bagheri, Amir Hajizadeh and Gholam Ali Rashid, in the form of a bloody wedding operation, and in a separate operation called Narnia, attacks were carried out against several scientists related to the nuclear program and their families in Tehran.

In this battle, the Zionist regime pursued three main goals: in the first step, the ineffectiveness of Iran's air defense was achieved by destroying pre-warrant radars, air bases and surface-to-air missile systems to open the path of the next phases. The following was a heavy blow to Iran's nuclear program, which targeted the US with the direct involvement of the United States and within the framework of midnight hammer operations, such as Fordow, Natanz, the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center, and the unfinished Khondab reactor. On the other hand, at the same time, the weakening of Iran's missile capabilities was on the agenda by destroying production centers and storage warehouses of ballistic missiles. An issue that after experiencing Israel's vulnerability to missile attacks, honest promise operations had become a vital priority for the Zionist regime. However, even these intensive attacks could not prevent Iran from responding.

Less than three hours after the first wave of Israeli attacks, the drone arm of the IRGC Aerospace Force executed the first wave of counter-attacks around ۶ a.m. Dozens of long-range suicide drones were sent to targets in the occupied territories.

Upon the night of June ۱۳ and symmetrical with the first speech of the Iranian leader, the first Iranian missile attack took place around ۲۱:۳۰ local time. This was the only introduction to the ۲۲-wave of massive missile attack during the ۱۲-day war between Iran and the Zionist regime. Missiles that, unlike Iran's previous operations,

have embraced broader targets. In its past two missile operations, Iran had focused only targeting military targets, and specifically Israeli air force bases.




However, the large scale of the Zionist regime's attacks included not only military centers, but also nuclear facilities, government buildings, hospitals, residential homes and urban areas, and thus widened the boundaries of the conflict. Hakim Children's Hospital, Children's Hospital, Obstetrics and Gynecology of Hazrat Fatima (peace be upon her), Shahid Mostafa Khomeini Hospital, Shahid Motahhari Burn Accident Hospital and Labafinejad Hospital in the capital of Iran, in addition to Kermanshah Farabi Hospital, were among the medical centers that suffered serious damage during the attacks of Mustafa Khomeini Hospital. On the other hand, ٩ ambulances and ٩ emergency bases were damaged. The emergency base of Hoveizeh and Kermanshah Health Center, which took care of pregnant mothers and infants, were completely destroyed. ٩ doctors, ٩ nurses and ٩ Red Crescent forces were martyred in the attacks.

The attack on civilian targets, especially apartments and residential homes, not only martyred commanders, scientists and their families, but also targeted a large number of civilian citizens. According to the statistics of the Iranian Ministry of Health, about ٧٠٠ civilians were martyred as a result of these attacks and more than ٥٠٠٠ civilians were injured. Among the martyrs were the names of at least ٩٩ women and ١٣ children. In another case, in the midst of the war, the Zionist regime tried to bombard the secret meeting of Iranian politicians present at the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, including the president and the speaker of the Islamic

Consultative Assembly.

This led Iran to attack government and infrastructure targets in the urban fabric in its defense plan, in addition to military and security centers. Although Iran has not disclosed the exact number of projectiles, Hebrew sources reported the launch of more than ۵۰۰ ballistic missiles; a figure between ۵۷۴ and ۶۳۱, which is equivalent to an average daily ۴۰ to ۵۲ shots.

With the onset of Iran's missile attacks, the Israeli military's military censorship department, which is considered as a branch of the regime's military intelligence office, took drastic measures to censor news, control of information, as well as limit the images published as a result of Iranian missile attacks and its consequences in the official and informal media. However, the limited images and information published show that Iran's goals can be explored in three military formats of security, infrastructure and residential areas. In the following, we will examine the most important points of the target.



Part One: Military Security Objectives

Camp Robin – Krya – Tel Aviv

Numerous news reports about the first wave of Iranian missile attacks indicate that a situation was targeted in central Tel Aviv. This position is the Robin camp, formerly known as the Matkal-11th camp, consisting of five main sections: the General Staff Tower, which is the location of the General Staff of the Army and the Ministry of Defense of the Zionist regime, the Marganite Tower as the administrative building of the General Staff of the Army and the Telecommunication Center, the Canary Towers where military offices, including the Air Force Headquarters, are located, the building-22 known as the House of Shimon Perez, and the Office of the Ministry of Defense. According to images released from the night of the attack, at least one point in this target range has been targeted. Also, in the news report published at the moment of the attack, news of the targeting of the Ministry of Defense of the Zionist regime was published.



Telnov Air Base – Kryat Akron – Rust

Telnov Air Base, also known as Air Base No. 8, hosts 106 and 133 (F-16C/D fighter jets), Squadrons 114 and 118 (CH-53K/D helicopters), Squadrons 210 (reconnaissance-

regreat drones), Squadron According to images of the Israeli army, fighter jets stationed at the base have participated in airstrikes against Iran during Operation Day of Repentance and Operation Lion-e-Kilris. Satellite images received from Tel Nouf base on July ۱۲, ۲۰۱۵, show that at least four structures were damaged or destroyed in the central part of the base during the ۱۲-day war. A close examination of these images also indicates that the organizational houses of the base were also targeted in the missile attack of Iran's Promise Sadegh ۲ missile attack, and at least eight buildings have been destroyed in the area, which they are now rebuilding.



In the satellite image above, the areas targeted at the Tel Noof Air Base are identified. In this image, the red areas were targeted during the ۱۲-day war and the orange areas during Operation Promise Sadiq ۲.

Camp Giliot – Herzlia – North Tel Aviv


The Giliot camps in the northern area of Tel Aviv, located at the intersection of Giliot in Herzlia, with an area of about ۲ square kilometers, house the main base of the ۸۲۰۰ unit of the Israeli military intelligence office (Aman). The complex includes the Herzog camp (establishment of the Faculty of Military Intelligence), Camp Dayan (the location of military colleges) and the Information Heritage Center and the Information Killed Memorial Center located east of the Ayalon Highway at the intersection of Giliot. To the west of the highway and in front of the Giliot camps is the Mossad building. According to images released from Iran's missile attacks on June ۱۷th, north of Tel Aviv, at least one missile hit was reported in a shed on the


area of Glylot camps. Although the Zionist regime tried to prevent the publication of news related to the incident by imposing military censorship, the initial images released from the site of the attack, which showed a sign with the badge of the regime's military intelligence department, confirmed that the target area belonged to Amman.



the Wiseman Institute of Science – Ruqavut – South Tel Aviv

The Wiseman Institute, as a research-oriented center, works in a variety of fields including mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology and biochemicals. In addition to research activities, the institute also participates in some scientific projects related to military technology companies. Among these projects are dual technologies (including the construction of sensors, imaging systems, remote sensing, etc.) and the ULTRASAT satellite construction project, which is being developed jointly by Al-Bit, the Israeli aerospace organization and the Wizman Institute. Two days after the Zionist regime's airstrikes on Iran, during the Iranian missile attacks on the central areas of the occupied territories on June 15th, news of the targeting of the Weissman Institute was reported.





Images and news reports published the following morning showed the destruction of two buildings on the site and damage to its laboratories. A review of satellite images received from the site of the Wiseman Institute of Science shows the direct impact of the Iranian ballistic missile on two buildings, including the Ulman Building (with the use of biology) and the new chemical building (under construction since ۲۰۲۱).



There are also explosions on at least four other buildings, including Isaac Wolfson's building, the Wolfson building, the Loki facility, and the Moscoveitz building. The center is likely to be targeted in response to the Zionist regime's attacks against Iran's Defense Research and Innovation Organization (Sepand). According to the news published, the Iranian missile attack on Weismann caused ۱۱۲ Weismann buildings to be damaged in addition to the destruction of the two buildings of the institute, of which ۵۲ residential buildings and ۶۰ laboratory buildings were. Among the damaged buildings, five buildings need to be renovated, and ۵۲ research laboratories and six service laboratories were destroyed. The damage to the institute caused the closure of a fifth to a quarter of the institute's work and caused material damage to it about \$۴۵۰ to \$۶۰۰ million.



In the satellite image above, two buildings in the area of the Weissman Institute, which are directly targeted by two Iranian ballistic missiles, are shown in red, and due to the explosion wave of the explosion, the missiles also caused damage to adjacent buildings at different levels, which is marked in orange.

Part Two: Infrastructure Economic Goals

Haifa Oil Refinery


After the Zionist regime's attack on the oil depot of Shahrn in the north of Tehran on June ۱۴th, Iran responded to the airstrike on June ۱۶th with a missile attack by the Haifa oil refinery. The refinery, formerly owned by the ICL Group, was handed over to


the Bazan Petrochemical Group in September ۲۰۲۲. According to the information of ۲۰۱۴, the group provides ۶۵ percent of the diesel fuel needed for the transportation of the Zionist regime, ۵۹ percent of gasoline and ۵۲ percent of the kerosene used by the regime's air fleet. Following the Iranian attack, at least three points of the Haifa refinery were targeted. According to the news, the attack killed three refinery staff and was postponed to the orbit of activity in October. Hebrew sources said the attack had between \$۱۵۰ million and \$۲۰۰ million in damages, of which only \$۴۸ million was secured by the compensation fund.



Twin Towers – Ramat Gen – Tel Aviv

The Ramat Gen Twin Towers is known as one of the few commercial buildings of the Diamond Exchange in Tel Aviv, which is used in commercial use based on available information. During the Iranian missile attack on June ۱۹, the Ramat Gan Diamond Exchange region, and specifically a range near the Ramat Gan Twin Towers were among the areas targeted by Iranian missiles. According to news reports, at least one building was demolished as a result of the attack, and adjacent buildings, including the twin towers of Ramat Gen, were also damaged by the explosion wave.





Part Three: Residential Areas

In the study of areas hit by Iranian ballistic missiles during the ۱۲-day war, residential areas were also among the areas where the effects of the collision can be seen. One of the most important reasons for the targeting of these areas is Iran's use of its old ballistic missiles, which was created due to the imperactization of Iran's western bases (known as the host of Iran's new generation of solid-fuel missiles) and caused Iran to rely heavily on its old generation's liquid-fueled missiles to carry out its missile attacks.

Iran's liquid fuel missiles, which are mainly based on the Shahab missile family and have been widely used in this war in the Qadr and Imad versions, will face more error than the Khybertken and Fatah family's solid-fuel ballistic missiles, along with the use of GPS/GNSS satellite-guided guidance system, under the influence of electronic warfare and the disruption of the navigation system in the terminal phase (re-entering RV/Mav).

The inherent error of Iran's ballistic missiles, along with the deployment of some military and security areas of the Zionist regime near the Kibuts, was one of the reasons for the impact of ballistic missiles on residential areas. For example, the deployment of the regime's anti-balastic air defense launchers within the Rabin camp in the Hakiria area of the central Tel Aviv region, which, according to the images of the first wave of Iran's missile attack on Tel Aviv on the evening of June ۱۳ (in which at least one hit was seen), the deployment of defense systems in central Tel Aviv and in the cover of residential areas is clearly visible.



BitYam Building 11 Floor – Tel Aviv

On the night of June 10, the central region of the occupied territories consisted of Tel Aviv, including the region, which was attacked by Iranian missiles. On the night of June 10, an 11-storey building, along with a 9-storey building in the area, was hit by Iranian missiles, killing at least seven people. By examining satellite images received from the target range of July 12, we can see the destruction traces in the buildings mentioned above.





Neo Yam Region – BitYAM – Tel Aviv

The New Yam residential area in the Reishon area south of Tel Aviv was among the areas targeted by Iranian missile attacks on the evening of June ۱۴. With a population of more than ۲۵۰ thousand, Rishon Letsion was the fifth most populous Zionist city by ۲۰۱۳. According to images released from Iran's June ۱۴th missile attacks on the region and the analysis of satellite images received on July ۱۲th, two buildings in the New Yam region have been completely destroyed by the direct impact of Iran's ballistic missile and their structures have now been dismantled. Also, news footage shows that at least ۱۱ other buildings in this area have been destroyed and damaged by the wave of explosions of Iranian ballistic missiles.




One of the highlights of the war was the unexpected combination of Iran's ballistic missiles. Most of the launches relied on liquid fuel missiles and older generations of Imad. Examples based on Shahab-۳ that the Qadr family with a simple detached warhead was unveiled in ۱۳۸۸ and Imad with a guided detachable cap in ۱۳۹۴. Another optimized version was also released in ۱۴۰۳. These systems have a larger body, lower accuracy, slower speed and higher error rate compared to modern generations such as Haj Qasim and Khyberbrehken, and they are easier to track for the enemy.






The challenge was created at a time when Iran's modern missile reserves were mainly stationed at the western, southwestern and northwest bases. Based on previous experiences, the Zionist regime has repeatedly targeted missile bases in the border provinces of West Azerbaijan, Lorestan, Kermanshah and Khuzestan, which host more than ten bases with modern reserves. The permanent patrol of the Zionist regime's aircraft made it possible to identify and attack the launchers and try to damage the entrance of tunnels and logistics routes. Although the underground sections remained largely intact, the damaged inputs caused the underground parts to remain confined.




In practice, the main burden of missile attacks was transferred to central and northern bases in the provinces of Isfahan, Tehran, Fars and Qazvin, often equipped

with long-range but older missiles. A limited number of modern missiles such as Khybershken^۲ and Haj Qasim were used with a high scrutive. The process included simultaneous firing of liquid fuel ballistics to saturate defenses and limited launch of advanced solid fuel against specific targets.



While Iran did not have the opportunity to fully utilize its power, the Zionist regime's anti-balestic network was strengthened in an unprecedented way. During the battle, the United States and the Zionist regime showed extensive cooperation in the field of integrated intelligence, command, operations and missile defense. At the same time as the decline of the Zionist interceptors' reserves against Iran's heavy attacks, Tel Aviv's dependence on US defense systems has increased. It is estimated that the United States has fired more than ۲۳۰ anti-inflammatory interceptor missiles to defend the Zionists. The Zionist regime's multilayer defense shield during this period consisted of standard-۳ atmospheric intermergator missiles, Arrow-۳, Todd, as well as intra-Equip interceptor missiles of the arrow-۲ and standard-۶.






The heavy cost paid by the United States to consume its limited ballistic interceptors' limited reserves showed the importance of the role of the US missile defense shield in support of the Zionist regime. Support for the advanced but limited defense system of the Zionists is known as one of the key factors of the Iran-Zionist regime's war, because the Zionists' ability to intercept almost doubled in a short period of time. Estimates show that the Zionist regime is able to fire up to ۱۰۰ anti-ballistic missiles at the same time; mobile launchers and concrete bunkers at ۴ well-known sites of Palmakhim, Ain Shamar, Tel Shahr and Eilat provide this capacity without needing to be reloaded. The United States also deployed two THAAD systems to support the Zionist regime: The first fire in southern Kryat Gett was deployed before the end of October ۲۰۱۴ and the second firebar in April ۲۰۲۵ near the Novatim Air Base.. Each THAAD fire truck has ۴۸ interceptor missiles with ۶ launchers and can be expanded up to ۹ launchers. According to the Wall Street Journal, during the ۱۲-day battle, more than ۱۵۰ THAAD missiles and about ۸۰ standard-۳ missiles were fired, equivalent to the full consumption of three THAAD batteries.

It is estimated that among the approximately ۵۷۴ ballistic missiles fired by Iran, the Zionist regime has tried to intercept ۲۵۷ missiles, ۲۰ of which have been successful, ۲۰ of which have been successful, ۲۰ semi-successful efforts and ۳۶ failed. And this was while the effects of the collision of Iranian missiles on the occupied territories were heavily censored.


The near future could provide Iran with significant opportunities. These opportunities can be defined in the form of revisions to military tactics, the reconstruction of industrial infrastructure related to missile power, the agility of existing systems, and the entry of a new generation of weapons into the operational cycle. However, these capabilities will only be maximized if the defense network and defense force are restored. In contrast, the reconstruction and restoration of Israel's anti-ballistic power will be a costly and time-consuming process that could change the balance of deterrence in the medium term for Iran's favor.



According to official statements by senior Iranian officials, including Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the representative of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution and the former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the former commander of the IRGC Air Force and the current head of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Iran had no direct experience of war with the Zionist regime until April ۲۰۱۴. Consequently, Operation Promise Sadegh ۱ is Iran's first operational experience in direct confrontation with the Zionist regime's defense systems. In the eyes of the Supreme Command of the Iranian Armed Forces, the results of this operation, although technically valuable, were not considered satisfactory from the perspective of operational effectiveness. In this operation, more than ۱۵۰ drones and ۱۰۰ ballistic missiles were simultaneously fired at targets deep in the occupied territories. However, the dramatic difference in the flight profile of these systems (including flight time of nine to ۱۰ hours for drones, about ۲.۵ hours for cruise missiles, and only ۱۲ to ۲۰ minutes for ballistic missiles) made the precise time coordination between the waves challenging. This experience was directly included in the design of subsequent operations, namely the promise of Sadegh ۲ and the Promise of Sadegh, so that the IRGC's missile command in the next stages, with more tactical independence and the timing of the firing, managed to increase the rate of impact and penetration of the Zionist regime's defense systems.

A significant portion of Iran's strategic assets appear to have not been deliberately used. Long-range ballistic missiles such as Sajjil, Khorramshahr-۳ and

Khorramshahr-۴, Shahed-۲۳۸-Simi-Suatre cruise drones, as well as surface-to-surface cruise missiles such as Abu Mahdi and Paveh remained in the arsenal. Given the lack of range restrictions on the depth of the occupied territories, this decision reflects the deterrence and maintenance of the power for the next possible phases of the conflict. The Khorramshahr missile family, including Iran's latest ballistic achievements, has modern navigation subsystems, advanced flight control systems, and optimal design to overcome multi-layered missile defense systems. Failure to use these missiles in the last ۱۲-day war could be a sign of the strategic capacity to future conflicts.



During the war, a number of facilities related to the production of solid fuel, explosives and parts of the infrastructure related to Iran's missile program were targeted by Israeli airstrikes. The key question is whether these attacks were able to disrupt Iran's ballistic missile production chain. Image evidence published by the media and independent analytical sources shows that part of the process of

producing Iranian missiles is carried out at underground and resistant facilities, including the display of Dezful ballistic missile assembly line installations in February ۲۰۱۹. In practice, this makes it impossible to completely destroy the Iranian missile production chain with the current capabilities of the Zionist regime. The process of transferring missile-to-ground production lines seems to continue at a faster pace in the future. Although the process of producing fuel and explosives at underground facilities could be very challenging, it will serve Iran's interest in the medium term.

In the event of a disruption in the production process, it is estimated that Iran's existing stockpiles will be able to support several consecutive rounds of conflict. In particular, the Khybertken and Fatah missiles with solid fuel propulsion and hypersonic, possibly involved in the destruction of the Haifa refinery, are considered very challenging from the perspective of anti-ballistic defense. It is estimated that a significant portion of these reserves remain intact in the bases of western Iran and are now scattered in the central parts of Iran.

On the other hand, the Zionist regime's defense costs are estimated in a similar, almost unbearable conflict. Although the exact statistics of the Zionist missile reserves are confidential, U.S. officials have described the situation as critical. According to the Financial Times on October ۱۵, ۲۰۱۴, the Zionist regime is facing a serious risk of interceptor missile shortages. According to Dana Stroll, the former deputy secretary of defense for the Middle East, the issue of ammunition is very serious. The CEO of the Zionist regime's aerospace industry (IAI) also announced that the production lines of interceptor missiles are operating in three shifts and at maximum capacity to replace only part of the consumed reserves.

The situation is not desirable in the United States. By ۲۰۲۵, only about ۹۰۰ Talon interceptor missiles were made by Lockheed Martin, of which ۱۹۲ have been delivered to the UAE and ۵۰ to Saudi Arabia. Of the ۶۵۸ remaining U.S.-owned, about ۲۵ were used in exercises and nearly ۱۵۰ were fired in the recent war. This means that U.S. operating inventory has been reduced to less than ۵۰۰, and in practice, a quarter of the ۸ U.S. operational firebases focused only on the occupied territories. This year, the United States will receive only ۱۲ new interceptors and only ۳۷ more in ۲۰۱۶. Even with a full annual production capacity of ۱۰۰, it will take more than ۱۸ months to rebuild reserves and may disrupt the delivery of foreign orders, such as ۳۶۰ Saudi missiles..

It should be noted that the US Navy's IGIS system also fired about ۸۰ standard-۳

missiles in this battle. By ۲۰۲۴, only about ۳۹۸ of these missiles had been delivered to the U.S. Navy. From ۲۰۱۳ to January ۲۰۲۵, more than ۴۰۰ rockets were used to counter Yemen's Ansar Allah cruise and ballistic missiles, including ۱۲۰ SM-۲ missiles, about ۸۰ SM-۶ and ۲۰ SM-SEM-۳ and a number of ESSMS. Considering the use of ۱۲ Tir in Operation Promise Sadegh ۲ and ۸۰ Tir in the promise of Sadegh ۳, about ۲۳% of the total stockpiles of the standard-۳ missiles have been consumed so far. These missiles, with a range of ۷۰۰ to ۹۰۰ kilometers, are among the few U.S. defenses against nuclear intercontinental missiles..

In any future conflict, if the United States fails to maintain its effective defense umbrella over the occupied territories, the damage to the Zionist regime will be multiplied and devastating.

Leave a comment

Your email address will not be published. The required parts are marked *

Your View *

Text Comment

Name and Surname *

Your name will be displayed

Email *

.Write your email correctly

Save my name, email, and ☐ website in the browser for when

۱۵ comments have been submitted for this.

Mohammad Bagher Vatanparast

We've made you warm

Reply

MESHAT

Hi. Be healthy and thank you for your kindness.

Reply

Seyyed

Good job again. In the section of the report, you have stated that

"One of the highlights of the war was the unexpected combination of Iran's ballistic missiles. Most of the

I'll re-enter.

ثبت دیدگاه

launches relied on liquid fuel missiles and older generations of Imad. Examples based on Shahab-۳ that the Qadr family with a simple detached warhead was unveiled in ۱۳۸۸ and Imad with a guided detachable cap in ۱۳۹۴. Another optimized version was also released in ۱۴۰۳. These systems have a larger body, lower accuracy, lower speed and higher error rate compared to modern generations such as Haj Qasim and Khyberbarken, and they are easier to track for the enemy.”

Regarding the accuracy of your words other than Imad about other systems, it is correct, but in the case of Imad, it is not correct.

As for speed, it does not seem to be less fuel for the liquids of value and Imad if they are not faster than solid fuel. I would be happy to hear your explanation.

[Reply](#)

Seyyed

It was very good and perfect, and thanks for the efforts of my friends.

I have a question for your service. Why do you say the fuel speed of Imad and Qad liquids is less than the speed of solid fuel?

[Reply](#)

Mehdi

Please write an article about the actual cep of Iranian missiles in Promise Sadegh ۳

[Reply](#)

A J

Your report was as great as ever. Especially when I read that your reporter, which was always the foot of the clips, I was in my head. Please continue the problems as before on YouTube on another strong platform.

[Reply](#)

MESHAT

سلام و ممنون از نظر لطف شما. اگر در آینده فرصت و امکانش فراهم بود، سعی می‌کنیم مجدد تولید برنامه‌های ویدیویی رو در دستور کارهای مشکلات

داشته باشیم.

پاسخ

مسلم

واقعا گزارش کامل و جامع و واقع گرایانه ای
بود ،

تشکر از زحمات تهیه کننده محترم این مطلب

پاسخ

MESHAT

سلام و ممنون از نظر لطف شما

پاسخ

مرتضی SK

سلام و باتشکر از زحمات شما

شاید در جنگ با سلاح های متعارف مقابل رژیم
بتوان به نصرت و پیروزی نسبی رسید ولی
قطعا هرگز نمی توان برآن پیروز شد! تا زمانی
که رژیم دارای سلاح هسته ای است؛ به همین
صورت تهاجم نصف نیمه و بسیار محتاطانه به
آن، و با تلفات بالا در ایران ادامه خواهد داشت.
درنظر داشته باشید اگر ایران دارای سلاح اتمی
می بود قطعا باهمین موشک ها برطبق قول
معروف خود در همان روز اول تل آبیب و حيفا
را با خاک یکسان می نمود.

سلاح هسته ای بیش هرزمان دیگر برای بقاء
ایران و همچنین بازدارنگی کامل درمقابل
نابودی و تجزیه این مملکت از نان شب واجبتر
است نه دوباره روز پس از جنگ ادامه همان
تجربه اشتباه و تکراری رونمایی از موشک جدید
یا شهر زیرزمینی فلان بیسار

پاسخ

رضا

سلام چرا در مورد هدف قرار گرفتن موساد چیزی ننوشتید

پاسخ

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سلام. تلاش کردیم به همه اهداف مهم اشاره کنیم. گزارش رو یک بار دیگه اگر فرصت داشتید مطالعه بفرمایید. ممنون از همراهی شما

پاسخ

رضا

سلام خسته نباشید خیلی عالی بود.
لطفا در رابطه با تعداد رادارهای ضد بالستیک موجود در اسرائیل به همراه مختصات دقیقشون و وضعیت متحرک بودنشون اگر امکانش هست مقاله ای منتشر کنید.
رادارهایی مثل گرین پاین، سوپر گرین پاین، اسپکترا، اولترا و AN/TPY۲

پاسخ

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سلام و ممنون از نظر لطف شما. ان شا الله تلاش می‌کنیم در آینده مطلبی در این رابطه آماده و منتشر کنیم.

پاسخ

داور آسوده

پاینده باد ایران که ذلت را نمیپذیرد. اسرائیل و آمریکا نظام سلطه هستند و ایرانی زیر سلزه

کسی نخواهد رفت

و از مظلونیت فلسطین دفاع کرد و رنج ان را به

جان هرید

پاسخ



وبسایت مشکات با رویکردی تحلیلی و راهبردی، به بررسی تحول‌های نظامی و امنیتی، معرفی سلاح‌ها و واکاوی تهدیدها می‌پردازد. هدف ما ارائه محتوای دقیق، مستند و فراتر از خبر برای درک عمیق‌تر از معادله‌های دفاعی و امنیتی ایران و منطقه است.



ساخته شده با ❤️ توسط تیم سایت لاینر

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